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The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the
Putative Father's Parental Rights
I.

lNTRODUGUON:

A

SURVEY OF STATE LAWs CURTAILING
THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS

The constitutionality of the legal disabilities that the states inflict
upon the illegitimate child has been the subject of recent discussion
both in the legal literature1 and in the cases.2 However, the constitutionality of similar discriminations against the father of an illegitimate child is only beginning to gain the same attention. 3 State laws
currently treat the putative father4 less favorably than other parents
with respect to privileges of parenthood such as custody of the child,
visitation rights, and an opportunity to be heard at adoption proceedings. 6
1. E.g., Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and G/ona v. American Guarantee b Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. I
(1969); Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967);
Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on
Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 338 (1969).
2. Weber v. Aetna Cas, & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); cases in Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 613
(1971).
3. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), revg. In re Stanley, 45 ID. 2d 132, 256
N.E.2d 814 (1970); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating
and remanding State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178
N.W.2d 56 (1970); Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child,
11 J. FAMILY L. 1 (1971); Note, Rights of a Putative Father in Relation to His Illegitimate Child: A Question of Equal Protection, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 770 (1971); Note,
Domestic Relations-Putative Father's Right to Custody of His Child, 1971 WIS, L.
REv. 1262.
4. Throughout this Comment the term "putative father" refers to the father of an
illegitimate child. It will be assumed that the identity of the putative father is known.
This assumption is not entirely realistic, but it is probably true in a majority of cases.
See R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK & B. EVANS, THE UNMARRIED FATHER: NEW APPROACHES FOR
HELPING UNMARRIED YouNG PARENTS 44, 85 (1971). The problem of identity is essentially
one of evidence. See Burnett v. Camden, 253 Ind. 354, 359-60, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202,
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 901 (1970); In re Crawford, 64 Misc. 2d 758, 763, 315 N.Y.S.2d
890, 896 (Sur. Ct. 1970). Cf. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76
(1968). For a discussion of the limitations a state may place on proof of paternity, see
note 49 infra.
5. In almost every state, the father of an illegitimate child has some sort of support
obligation. This obligation, although perhaps burdensome, is not here considered to
be a discrimination against the father. Actually, these obligations make the father's
duties more equal to those of legitimate parents. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAw OF
Do:r,msnc RELATIONS § 5.3 (1968). The Supreme Court has recently granted review in
two cases raising the issue whether the equal protection clause mandates that states
require putative fathers to support their children because other parents must do so.
S. v. D., 335 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. postponed, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972);
L - G - v. F - 0. P - , 466 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Gomez v. Perez, 40 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. June 26, 1972). See also R - v. R - ,
431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968); Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968).
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A brief survey of these state laws illustrates the nature and scope
of discrimination against the putative father. 6 In the case of the
legitimate child, if the parents should separate, each parent generally
has an equal right to custody.7 However, the father of an illegitimate
child has no such equality with the child's mother. If the mother
of an illegitimate child is a fit parent, she is given custody.8 This
automatic preference for the mother has been applied even when
it is far from clear that granting the mother custody will best serve
the child's welfare.9 If the mother is dead or unfit, several states give
custody of the child to a putative father who is a fit parent; 10 but
6. The laws discriminating against the putative father often will not apply if there
has been a formal procedure to legitimate the child born out of wedlock. There is a
wide variation among the various state legitimation laws, but a brief summary will be
attempted here. Some states still allow the old common law marriage as a form of
legitimation, See Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 S, 885 (1915); Umbenhower v. Labus,
85 Ohio St. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912). Commonly, subsequent intermarriage of the parents
will legitimate the children, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 10 (1958); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN.
§ 45-274 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.091 (1964), although often recognition or acknowl•
edgment by the father that the child is his is necessary, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN, § 6114l(b) (1971); ILL. REv. STAT, ch. 3, § 12 (1971); KAN. STAT, ANN. § 23-126 (Supp, 1971),
Several states provide for legitimation by acknowledgment or some form of writing,
e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 11 (Supp. 1969); CAL, PROB, CODE§ 255 (West 1956); DEL, CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.29 (1964); MICH, COMP, LAws ANN.
§ 702.83 (1968). Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1964). A few states provide for complete
legitimation if the father receives the child into his home {if he is married, his wife
must consent). E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 (West 1954); UTAH CODE ANN, 78-30-12 (1953).
Finally, Arizona, North Dakota, and Oregon consider all children to be legitimate.
Aruz. REv. STAT. § 14-206 (1956); ORE. REv, STAT, § 109.060 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 56-01-05 (1971). Cf. Ar.As. STAT. § 25.20.050 (1962) (providing for legitimacy if
paternity is ascertained}, The problem under these statutes is to establish the legal
relationship between father and child by evidentiary means, See Aruz. REv. STAT.
§ 12-621 (1956), § 12-843 (Supp. 1971); ORE, REv. STAT. § 109.070 (1971). This is only a
brief sketch of the various statutes. For a more complete discussion and more au•
thorities, see H. KRAUSE, lLLEGmMACY! LAW AND SOCIAL POUCY 10-21, 297-306 (1971):
H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 5.2; Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 84-88 (1959);
Annot., 33 A.LR.2d 705 (1954).
Legitimation statutes will be largely ignored in this Comment since these statutes
are often too narrow in their formalistic requirements to legitimate many children.
See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 5.2, at 159. Also, many of these statutes only legitimate
the child for the purpose of intestate succession. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 255 (West 1956);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 153-2-8 (1964); CoNN, GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-274 (1960); IND, STAT.
ANN. § 6-207 (Burns 1953); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1971).
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-106 (1964); N.Y. DoM. REL. I.Aw § 70 (McKinney
1964). Courts and statutes sometimes speak of favoring the mother in the case of chil•
dren of tender years, but this is done only if all other factors are equal, Sec CAL, C1v,
CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1972): Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir, 1945): Adams
v. Adams, 206 Ga. 881, 59 S.E.2d 366 (1950).
8. E.g., CAL. C1v. CODE § 200 (West 1954); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 45--43 (Supp.
1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-5 (1971);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05 (1971): ORE. REv. STAT. § 109-080 (1971); Wis. STAT, ANN.
§ 48.13 (1957), § 48.02 (Supp. 1972); Blakemore v. Blakemore, 217 Ga, 174, 121 S.E,2d 642
(1961); In re McGraw, 228 N.C. 46, 44 S.E.2d 349 (1947). But see Godinez v. Russo, 49
Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Family Ct. 1966).
9. See Roe v. Doe, 58 Misc. 2d 757, 296 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Family Ct. 1968); Jolly v.
Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Gilford v. Miller,
213 Pa. Super. 269, 248 A.2d 63 (1968),
lO. Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); In re Guardianship
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even under these circumstances, some states still deny custody to
the putative father. 11 Thus, the putative father's right to custody is
sharply circumscribed.
A parent who does not have custody of the child may desire visitation privileges. Usually this is not a problem for the separated parents
of legitimate children.12 There are few reported cases concerning the
efforts of the putative father to gain visitation rights, perhaps because
few putative fathers desire to visit their illegitimate children or
because the issue arises only if the mother refuses to allow the visits.
Most courts that have considered the matter grant visitation privileges to the putative father if a close familial relationship has
existed between father and child.13 One court has even ordered
visitation when there had been no previous social relationship between the father and his one-year-old child.14 Only the Illinois courts
have refused under any circumstances to enforce visitation privileges
for the putative father.rn In regard to visitation rights, at least, the
putative father has gained a measure of legal equality with other
parents.
Adoption terminates the existing legal relationship between parents and child and substitutes a new legal relationship with a
different set of parents.16 In normal circumstances, both parents of a
legitimate child must consent to their child's adoption, while only
the mother's consent is a prerequisite to the adoption of an illegitiof Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P .2d 888 (1954); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154
N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W.2d 449 (1962); Torres v. Gonzales, 80 N.M. 35, 450 P.2d 921 (1969); Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d 202, 165 N.Y.S.2d
290 (Sup. Ct. 1957); State in the Interest of M., 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P .2d 1013 (1970).
Some courts even talk of the father's prior right to custody in this situation. Caruso v.
Superior Court, 100 Ariz. at 173, 412 P.2d at 467; In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal.
· 2d at 92-93, 265 P.2d at 889 (plurality opinion); Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d at 203,
165 N.Y.S.2d at 291-92.
11. In re Adoption of A., 226 A.2d 823 (Del. 1967); Hall v. Hall, 222 Ga. 820, 152
S.E.2d 737 (1966); In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), reud. sub nom.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.4, at 590.
13. Bagwell v. Powell, 267 Ala. 19, 99 S.2d 195 (1956) (child legitimated); Strong v.
Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336,205 P.2d 48 (1949) (child legitimated); Mixon v. Mize, 198
S.2d 373 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 204 S.2d 211 (Fla. 1967); Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq.
135, 85 A. 816 (1913); People ex rel. "Francois" v. "lvanova", 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961); Cornell v. Hartley, 54 Misc. 2d '132, 283 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Family Ct.
1967); In re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Ex parte
Hendrix, 186 Okla. '112, 100 P.2d 444 (1940) (child legitimated); Commonwealth v.
Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965), overruUng Commonwealth ex rel.
Golembewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965). See generally Recent
Development, A Father's Right To Visit His Illegitimate Child, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 738
(1966).
14. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 289 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Family Ct. 1968).
15. DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill. 2d 154, 219 N.E.2d 465 (1966); Wallace v. Wallace, 60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 4 (1965).
16. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-17 (1971); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 14-15-14
(1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-10, 78-30-11 (1953). See generally H. Cr.ARK, supra
note 5, § 18.9
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mate child.17 The putative father is usually completely ignored in
adoption proceedings; 18 neither his consent10 nor notice to him of
the pending adoption 20 is necessary. If the father learns of the adoption proceedings and attempts to intervene, some courts allow him
to do so and, in appropriate cases, to gain custody of the child.21
However, this is a minor exception to the generally valid proposition
that the putative father plays no role in adoption. It remains possible
for a concerned putative father to lose his parental rights simply
because he is unaware of the pending adoption. 22
The number of children and fathers affected by laws disfavoring
the putative father is by no means insignificant. In 1968 alone there
were approximately 339,200 illegitimate births.23 In 1969 approximately 109,000 children who had been born out of wedlock were
adopted, representing almost ninety per cent of all adoptions by nonrelatives of the child.24 As late as the fall of 1971 it appeared that
no change in this area of family law would be mandated by any doctrine. However, recent cases and the proposed constitutional amendment requiring that equality of rights not be denied on grounds of
sex25 may portend impending change. This Comment will first
examine whether the equal protection or due process clauses of the
17. E.g., Cu.. CIV. CODE§ 224 (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. DOM, REL. LA'\V § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1971). The only exceptions to this general rule are when a parent is
somehow unfit or when a divorced parent of a legitimate child docs not have custody.
See Katz, Judidal and Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 51 GEo, L.J. 64, 77-85
(1962).
18. See H. KRAusE, supra note 6, at 32.
19. E.g., Cu.. CIV. CoDE § 224 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT, ANN. § 59-2102 (Supp.
1971); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.D. Cmr. CoDE § 14-15-05
(1971); ORE. REv. STAT. § 109.080 (1971). See also Parsons v. Stout, 76 Wash. 2d 487,
457 P .2d 544 (1969).
Some states require the father's consent if his parenthood has been adjudged in a
paternity proceeding, e.g., .ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN, § 56--106 (1971).
20. AI.As. STAT. § 20.10.040 (Supp. 1971); IND. STAT. ANN. § !l-120 (Burns Supp. 1970)
(court can order notice in its discretion); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 109.080 (1971); N.D. Cmr,
CODE § 14-15-06 (1971); WIS. STAT, .ANN. § 48.88 (Supp. 1971), Many statutes do not
make this explicit, but since no consent is required, the courts probably will not require
notice. See In re Adoption of A., 226 A.2d 823, 824 (Del. 1967), interpreting DEL, CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (1953).
21. Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); In re Brennan, 270
Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965); In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1968),
decided on the merits, 269 Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964); State in Interest of M,, 25
Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970).
22. See In re Sarkissian, 215 Cal. App. 2d 554, 30 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1968); Jambrone
v. David, 16 Ill. 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 569 (1959); Thomas v. Children's Aid Sodety, 12
Utah 2d 235,364 P.2d 1029 (1961). But see In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d
27 (1967).
23. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (1971).
24. NATIONAL CENTER FOi\ SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. HEALnt, EDUCATION, AND
WELFA_RE, ADOPTIONS IN 1969, at 1-2 (1969).
25. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8-9, 92d Cong,, 1st Sess.
(1971). These resolutions are identical; later citations will be to the House resolution
alone.
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Constitution presently proscribe disparate treatment of the putative
father, as compared with other parents, in regard to parental privileges. Attention will then be given to an assessment of the potential
impact of the proposed "equal rights" amendment on the putative
father's rights in relation to his illegitimate child.
II.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Review Under the Traditional Equal
Protection Standard

The equal protection clause does not require that a state treat
all persons, no matter how situated, alike. It is necessary that laws
classify persons into different groups for a variety of purposes. Under
the traditional equal protection standard, only a permissible purpose
and a classification rationally related to that purpose are required. 26 .
Although there are some indications to the contrary,27 classifications
are generally set aside only if "no grounds can be conceived to justify
them." 28
The Court normally does not require that the classification perfectly separate those who are targets of the statute's purpose from
those who are not. 29 When the standard of review is the existence
of a rational relation, the Court has said that classifications need
not be "mathematically precise,"30 and has upheld some classifications that on their face appear rather arbitrary. 31
While the legislative purposes of state laws that single out putative
fathers for differential treatment are not clear, at least tw-o primary
26. E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See generally
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065, 1077-87 (1969).
The Court is not likely to attribute an impermissible purpose to the state. See, e.g.,
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
27. Some cases in which the rational basis test was allegedly applied seem in fact
to have employed a stricter standard of review. This conclusion depends more on the
reader's comparison of the cases than on any language used by the Court. Compare
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), with Richardson v. Belcher, 404 u.s: 78 (1971);
and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), with Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
28. McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
29. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970).
30. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
31. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (offset in Social Security disability
payments if worker receives workmen's compensation payments but not if he receives
private insurance payments); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (maximum
limit on welfare payments no matter how large the family and its needs and regardless
of the parents' inability to work); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949) (owner of truck could post on it advertising for his own business but not for
another's business); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (only women who were
wives or daughters of male bar owners could work as bartenders); Kotch v. Board
of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (jobs as riverboat pilots given only to
relatives and friends of current pilots).
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purposes can reasonably be attributed to such laws.32 The first is to
punish the putative father for his "sins" in order to deter promiscuity
and illegitimacy and to encourage marriage and the preservation of
the legitimate family unit.33 A second purpose, and surely what
ought to be the controlling consideration, is to further the welfare
of the illegitimate child.34 Legislatures and courts might believe that
the putative father is generally not likely to have an actual social
relationship with his child and is not likely to be a fit parent.
Statutory discriminations against putative fathers do not in every
case accomplish the purposes that they are ostensibly designed to
advance. Whether the denial of parental privileges deters promiscuity and illegitimacy is particularly doubtful. The Supreme Court
has flatly rejected the contention that the denial of recovery to a
mother for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child would deter
illegitimacy.35 The purpose of discouraging promiscuity and illegitimacy is perhaps less farfetched in the context of laws affecting parental privileges such as custody, since parents are more likely to have
children in order to enjoy their custody than to collect damages for
their wrongful death. But the state has denigrated this purpose by
refusing to apply the sanctions curtailing parental privileges to
mothers of illegitimate children.86 In addition, even if both the
mother and the father of an illegitimate child were denied parental
privileges, it would appear questionable whether such sanctions
could counteract the complex social and psychological forces that
foster illegitimacy and promiscuity.37 Finally, it is submitted that the
purpose of deterring promiscuity should be disregarded if its furtherance by means of depriving parents of custody would conflict with
what should be the controlling purpose-promoting the child's welfare. Certainly, this is the case whenever a fit parent is separated from
or denied custody of his illegitimate child.
Nevertheless, a court that is merely looking for a rational relation
between the classification and its purpose would be likely to uphold
laws that discriminate against the putative father. Broad generalizations concerning the illegitimate child's welfare support classifications
limiting the custody, visitation, and adoption interests of the putative
father. A rational legislature could believe that usually the illegitimate child's welfare will be furthered by living with the mother
32. For a discussion on attributing purposes to laws, see Developments in the Law,
supra note 26, at 1077-81.
33. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 73-78.
34. See !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-2, 701-14, 702-5 (1971).
35. Glona v. American Guar. &: Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). See text
accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
36. See notes 6-22 supra and accompanying text.
37. See R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK &: B. EVANS, supra note 4, at 147-55; H. KRAUSE,
supra note 6, at 257-67.
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rather than with the father. 38 Those states that deny the putative
father any right to custody, even when the mother is dead or unfit,89
may rationally believe that the interests of the child will be best
served by his living with other relatives or guardians.40 The putative
father may generally be less fit as a guardian than others. Even Illinois, the only state that completely denies the father visitation privileges,41 is not necessarily irrational in assuming that the putative
father's visits may harm the child. For example, the visits might well
impress upon the child a stigma of illegitimacy or embarrass both
mother and child by advertising the child's illegitimacy to the neighbors.42 Finally, the current exclusion of the putative father from
adoption proceedings48 is justifiable if one assumes that adoption,
with the mother's consent, usually advances the child's interest. This
assumption appears rational since adoptive parents are carefully
screened and presumably the child will be better off with two such
parents than with his natural father. 44
Thus, current state laws have a conceivable basis supporting them
and would pass the rational relation test. This conclusion is confirmed by two recent state decisions that upheld under this test classifications that discriminated against the putative father. 46

B. Review Under the Compelling Interest Test:
The Search for a Fundamental Interest or
Suspect Classification
I. The Validity of Current Classifications Under
Strict Review
Although classifications that affect the rights of putative fathers
would be upheld under the rational relation test, in certain instances
the Court will abandon its laissez-faire attitude and will uphold a
38. Cf, J. BOWLBY, CHlLD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LoVE 15 (2d ed. 1965).
39. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
40. See In re Stanley, 45 m. 2d Hl2, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970), revd. sub nom.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
41. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
42. See People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova," 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 318-23, 221
N.Y.S.2d 75, 77-81 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v.
Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965), overruled by Commonwealth v. Rozanski,
206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965).
43. See authorities cited in notes 18-22 supra.
44. See State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 431-34, 178
N.W.2d 56, 61-63 (1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
45. In re Stanley, 45 m. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), revd. sub nom. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d
420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). For a discussion of Stanley, see text accompanying notes
132-57 infra.
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classification only if it is justified by a compelling state interest.40
Under this standard of review, the Court will indeed demand that
the classification further the state's interest with mathematical precision.47 Thus, the choice of the applicable standard of review will usually determine the outcome of a case.48 Almost every classification can
ineet the rational relation test; few can withstand the strict scrutiny
of the compelling state interest standard.
It is unlikely that the laws curtailing the parental rights of putative fathers could withstand such strict scrutiny. The assertion that
these laws deter promiscuity and illegitimacy, thereby protecting the
integrity of the legitimate family unit, would fail since mathematical
precision would require that the same sanctions be applied against
the mother as are now imposed against the putative father. Similarly,
the purpose of promoting the child's welfare does not justify automatically disfavoring all putative fathers. 40
Certainly, the welfare of the child must be considered a com•
pelling interest.50 But however true it may generally be that the
mother should be awarded custody in order to further this interest,
there are situations in which the father can provide a better environ•
ment for the child's development than the mother. Resolving the
controversy over whose custody will further the best interest of
the child is complex, and no rule of thumb is adequate in every
case. 61 Since in custody proceedings the parties are already in court,
it should not be difficult for the court to consider evidence regarding
what each parent has to offer the child. 52 This might expend more
46. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
47. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969),
48. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970),
49. Some states grant known fathers of illegitimate children full equality of parental
rights with the mother, but only if they prove their identity and legitimate the child
in accordance with a specified procedure. See, e.g., CAL, C1v. CooE § 230 (West 1954),
Such statutes may also fail to survive strict scrutiny, for their imprecise classifications
still ignore the individual fact situation. The identity of the father and his concern
for the child may be clear, and yet, for one reason or another, he may not have
legitimated the child in the only permissible way. There appears to be no compelling
reason for precluding all putative fathers from presenting evidence concerning their
paternity if the issue has not been foreclosed in previous litigation, The states may
provide simple means of legitimation, but should not make them tl1e exclusive
prerequisite for recognition of the putative father's rights.
'
50. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
However, some states have adopted the so-called "parental right" theory to resolve
disputes between a natural parent and an outsider. Under this theory the parent is to
be preferred, unless shown to be unfit; and the cltild's best interest, as such, is not an
issue. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.5, at 591-93; Note, Alternatives to "Parental
Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 152-56
(1963). Arguably, those states that take this approach cannot contend that the cltlld's
interest is to them a compelling state interest for they decline to regard it as compelling
in every case.
51. See Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L, REv. 55, 67-74 (1969); Note, supra note 50, at 166-67.
52. Such court hearings do not guarantee that the evidence will be of high quality
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court time, but the saving of court time is certainly not a compelling
state interest.53 Similarly, in custody controversies between the father
and third parties the best interest of the child in the individual case
can and should be determined.
The same solution is required for any disputes concerning visitation rights: laws will not withstand strict scrutiny unless they decide
the issue of the child's welfare in the individual case. While it is
possible that the putative father's visits will harm the child, 54 they
might instill in the child a sense of his father's love. The father may
be able to develop desirable qualities in the child that the mother
cannot. He may also be able to ensure that his support money is
being spent wisely and to investigate whether the mother is fulfilling
her parental duties. 5 5
These results do not necessarily mean that there would be large
numbers of putative fathers gaining custody of their children or
even rights to visit their children. Probably most fathers, even if
interested in their child, would be content to leave the child in the
mother's custody; and in custody suits between parents, it seems
likely that the mother will usually prevail. Although the putative
father may be more interested in his offspring than is commonly
thought, 56 the fact remains, especially for young children, that the
mother-child relationship is very special in our society. 57 Courts
might decide in many cases that visitation would do everyone concerned more harm than good. The constitutional objection to
custody and visitation laws automatically disfavoring the putative
father is not that they are grounded on generally invalid justifications, but rather that they fail to take into account particular cases
and individual characteristics. The child's welfare is best promoted by
laws that allow at least a consideration of what impact either custody
of or visitation by the putative father will have on the child.
The current laws that fail to give the putative father notice of a
pending adoption and fail to require his consent likewise are not
mathematically precise: The consent of the mother of an illegitimate
child has been required in situations when adoption would further
the child's welfare; 58 and the putative father's consent has not been
required when adoption may have harmed the child by separating
or the court competent to decide the custody issue; but this is a problem for family-law
reform, not constitutional law. See generally Watson, supra note 51, at 57-64.
53. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
55. See Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965); Recent
Development, supra note 13.
56. See R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK &: B. EVANS, supra note 4, at 85.
57. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 38, at 15.
58. In re Mathers, 371 Mich. 516, 124 N.W.2d .878 (1963); Harvey Adoption Case,
375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953).
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him from a fit parent.59 This impression of classification would
normally be enough to invalidate the classifications under the compelling state interest test. Consent laws affecting adoption can be
more precisely formulated to protect the welfare of the child by
means less restrictive of the putative father's interest. Requiring his
consent will not necessarily harm the child. It need not delay adoption proceedings to the child's detriment, for some delay is already
built into these proceedings. 00 While consultations that decide the
child's future have typically involved only the mother, successful
efforts have been made to include the father. 61 Thus, little inconvenience would result if he too must acquiesce in the adoption decision.
Given a general consent requirement, an adoption that might
further the child's interests could still be completed if the putative
father could not be found or refused to give his consent. Certainly,
as a matter of due process the father's rights to his child could be
terminated at a hearing even though he was not present if a reasonable effort had been made to find him. 62 Moreover, even now the
mother's consent is not required in all circumstances.68 One very
common substantive ground for dispensing with consent is abandonment;64 surely, if a father neglects to support or even to visit his
child, his inaction must be considered abandonment. 60 Should the
father refuse to consent to an adoption that would be in the child's
59. In re Sarkissian, 215 Cal. App. 2d 554, 30 Cal. Rptr. ll87 (1963); Jambrone v.
David, 16 Ill 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 569 (1959). See also In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122,
154 N.W.2d 27 (1967).
60. Procedures such as hearings, agency investigations, and placement invariably
take time. Also, there is often a six-month delay between interlocutory and final
decrees. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 18.ll; C. &: H. Doss, IF You AnoPT A CHILD 102·25,
147-58 (1957); Katz, supra note 17, at 91-94.
61. R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK &: B. EVANS, supra note 4, at 85-92. This book is the
result of the study of the efforts of one social agency randomly to include the putative
father in decisions concerning the child's future. The researchers found that in most
cases the mother will name the father and that the father will respond to the agency's
invitation to discuss the situation. Id. at 44. This sharing of responsibility by the father
actually proved to help the mother psychologically. Id. at 92.
The leading chain of maternal-care homes-the Florence Crittenton Assodationhas now begun to counsel the putative father as part of its program for the unwed
mother. NEWSWEEK, March 27, 1972, at 100.
62. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. ll06, 314-15 (1950).
A similar situation arises if the mother refuses to or cannot name the father, although
there is some indication that ths is rare. See R. PANNOR, F. l\!ASSARIK &: B. EVANS, supra
note 4, at 44.
63. H. Cr.ARK, supra note 5, § 18.5; Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under
Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parents, 39 U. DET, L.J.
ll47, 362-69 (1962).
64. E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); CAL. C1v. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1972);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (1971); N.Y. DoM. REL. I.Aw § 111 (McKinney Supp.
1971).
65. Cf. Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952); In Te Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d
429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 1'76 N.Y.S.2d 281 {1958).
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best interest, his rights could be terminated if the adoption statute
provided that a consent requirement may be waived when such
waiver is in the child's best interest. Indeed, some states already have
statutes of this sort.66 This procedure would further the child's welfare and effect a lesser infringement upon the putative father's
interests than current laws. A possible failure to gain the father's
consent is no reason to require only the mother's. Under the compelling state interest test, the states must use "less drastic means" 67
to further the child's interests.
It is unlikely that requiring the putative father's consent would
deter prospective adoptive parents and cause children to go unadopted. An additional consent requirement would add merely a
small increment to the large amount of red tape adoptive parents
already face. Also, it might be noted that those states that allow the
mother to revoke her consent and regain custody after the child has
been placed in an adoptive home68 can scarely argue that they are
encouraging adoption. No compelling reason seems to exist for declining to require generally the father's consent.69
Thus, although the laws curtailing the parental privileges of the
putative father are rationally related to the state's objectives, they
are not able to withstand review under the more demanding equal
protection standard. The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether these
laws are indeed subject to review under the compelling state interest
standard. Before that standard can be utilized, a classification must
either affect a "fundamental interest," such as voting;r0 or be based
upon a "suspect classification," such as race.71
The state laws that govern the putative father's parental rights
classify parents by two methods. The first is by the legitimacy of the
child: the father of an illegitimate child has fewer parental rights
than the father of a legitimate child.72 The second is by sex: the
66. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-06 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CoDE § 16-304 (1967); MD.
art. 16, § 74 (Supp. 1971); VA. CollE § 6.3.1-225 (Supp. 1972). Of course, a
court must enforce these provisions in order for them to be effective. See Simpson, supra
note 63, at 380-81.
67. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
637 (1969).
68. For one rather well-publicized example of this, see People ex rel. Scarpetta v.
Spence-Chapin AdoptioJ:1. Serv., 28 N,Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, appeal
dismissed sub nom. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971). See generally Katz,
supra note 17, at 87-91.
69. Conceivably, a state could avoid the equal protection problem by not requiring
any parents' consent prior to adoption since all parents would be treated equally. But
cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But if such a law impinged too greatly on
parental rights, due process might be violated. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
70. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, .377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
71. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, .379 U.S. 184, 191-94 (1964).
72. In the subsequent disrussion, any distinction between the classifications that
COJ>E ANN.
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father of an illegitimate child has fewer rights than the mother of
the same child. In addition, these laws infringe upon the relationship between the putative father and his illegitimate child. Therefore, the compelling interest test might be invoked-with a resulting
invalidation of the laws discriminating against the putative fatherif illegitimacy or sex are "suspect classifications," or if the putative
father's interest in a relationship with his illegitimate child is
"fundamental."

2. The Rise and Fall of Illegitimacy as a
Suspect Classification, and the Unlikely
Possibility That the Putative Father's
Interest in His Child Is Fundamental
Recently, Levy v. Louisiana78 and Glona v. American Guarantee
& Liability Insurance Co.74 raised the possibility that the putative

father-illegitimate child relationship may be entitled to protection
as a fundamental interest, or, alternatively, that classifications based
on illegitimacy are, like racial classifications, inherently suspect. Both
cases involved statutory classifications based on a child's legitimacy.
In Levy, five illegitimate children were precluded from suing for
their mother's wrongful death solely because of their illegitimacy.
The Supreme Court held that the statutory denial of wrongful death
benefits to these illegitimate children for the death of their mother
violated the equal protection clause.75 The grounds for the decision,
however, were unclear. 76 . Some of the Court's language stressed that
there was no rational relationship between the classification and some
legitimate state purpose.77 However, the decision might have suggested that illegitimacy was a suspect classification,78 invoking a
discriminate against the illegitimate child and those that discriminate against the
putative father will be ignored. Strictly speaking, both sets of laws classify on the
legitimacy of the child. However, it can be maintained that only classifications that
discriminate directly against the child should be suspect. After all, the father, unlike
the child, has some control in determining the status of the child, Only for the child
does legitimacy become a factor, like race, over which the individual has no control.
This problem might be overcome by maintaining that the child will be harmed if he
is denied the company of a fit father and that the child cannot usually claim this right,
Therefore, the father should have standing to raise a claim of the child's rights.
Cf, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In light of the conclusion that illegitimacy
is not a suspect classification, see text accompanying notes 85·96 infra, this problem is
moot.
73. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
74. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
75. 391 U.S. at 72.
76. See Gray & Rudovsky, supra note I, at 2•14 (1969).
77. "Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the line
drawn is a rational one." 391 U.S. at 71.
78. "We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against them when no action,
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stricter scrutiny of the classification by the Court. In addition, the
Court stated:
[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights
. . . and have not hestitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its side.... The
rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own mother.79 ·
Thus, the decision may also be read broadly to suggest that the
"familial relationship" betw·een mother and child is a fundamental
interest. By analogy, the relationship between the putative father and
his child may also be fundamental.
In Glona, the companion case to Levy, a mother was precluded
by statute from suing for her illegitimate son's ·wrongful death. Again
the Court held that the statutory classification, discriminating this
time against the mother of the illegitimate child, violated the equal
protection clause.80 However, in Glona, the Court's language suggests unambiguously that the statutory classification was irrational
under the traditional equal protection standard.81 If the Court intended to hold in Levy that the relationship between mother and
illegitimate child is fundamental, or that illegitimacy is a suspect
classification, it could have decided Glona more easily by applying
the compelling state interest standard to invalidate the state wrongful death statute that was hostile to the relationship bet1veen the
mother and her illegitimate children. Unlike the case in Levy, the
sanction in Glona applied directly to the "sinning" mother rather
than against the innocent child. Thus, the relationship between the
asserted purpose to deter illegitimacy and the classification denying
wrongful death benefits seems somewhat more rational than that in
Levy. 82 Indeed, when one considers some of the classifications based
on tenuous grounds that have been upheld by the Court before and
since Glona, 88 the result reached by the Court is a bit puzzling. It
might have appeared that the Court's ostensible application of the
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
mother." 391 U.S. at 72.
79. 391 U.S. at 71.
80. 391 U.S. at 75-76.
81. "Yet we see no possible rational basis .•. for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause
of illegitimacy will be served." 391 U.S. at 75.
82. Cf. 391 U.S. at 76-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued, inter alia,
that it is logical for the state to enforce its requirements of marriage by declaring that
certain rights are dependent upon formal family relationships. Whatever the efficacy
of this argument in Levy, where the child had no control over its parents' activities, it
certainly is stronger as applied in Glona to the mother of the child. See H. KRAusE,
supra note 6, at 67.
83. See cases cited in note 31 supra.
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rationality test in Glona, as well as its ambiguous language in Levy,
was an initial step toward holding that illegitimacy was a suspect
classification or that the relationship between parent and illegitimate
child was fundamental. 84
Whatever those two decisions meant, they were limited by the
Court's five-to-four decision in Labine v. Vincent. 86 In that case the
father of an illegitimate girl, who had lived with him, died intestate.
Because he had acknowledged her as his daughter, she could have
been a legatee in his will under Louisiana law, but not his heir.so
In contrast, a legitimate child was not only an heir, but could not
even be disinherited by a will.87 In an opinion with remarkably little
discussion about equal protection the Court, applying at best the
rational relation test,88 upheld the classification. The Court in this
case made it clear that illegitimacy is not a suspect classification.so
Moreover, the Court's summary treatment of the equal protection
issue suggests that the relationship betwe·en an illegitimate child
and his father is not fundamental. Labine may have closed the door
to several of the possible routes to invocation of the compelling interest test when laws curtailing the parental rights of putative fathers
are at issue.
This conclusion is not changed by the recent decision of Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.00 Under Louisiana law, an unacknowledged illegitimate child could not recover under the workmen's compensation statute for his father's death on the same basis
as a legitimate child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.91 The
decedent had four dependent legitimate children and two illegitimate children, whom he could not legally acknowledge. 02 The latter
children were totally denied a share of the workmen's compensation
benefits for their father's death. The Supreme Court, relying heavily
on Levy, 98 said that the inquiry in equal protection was a dual one:
84. Cf. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 14, in which the authors express their
belief that the Court in Glona took the middle position between the two standards
of review.
85. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 200, 202, 206, 919 (West 1952),
87. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1495 (West 1952).
88. See 401 U.S. at 536 n.6:
Even if we were to apply the "rational basis" test to the Louisiana intestate
succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's
interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left
within the State.
89. "Levy did not say and cannot fairly be read to say that a State can never treat
an illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring." 401 U.S. at 5!16.
90. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
91. LA. REv. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 1021(3), 1232(4)-(6), 1232(8) (West 1964).
92. See LA. Crv. CODE art. 204 (West 1952).
93. Given the similarities in the origins and purposes of [the wrongful death and
workmen's compensation statutes] ••• it would require a disregard of precedent
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"What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What
fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" 94
The Court held that no legitimate state interest justified Louisiana's
classification scheme, 05 but did not discuss whether the state's discrimination against unacknowledged illegitimate children endangered any fundamental personal rights. The Weber Court's
language does not suggest that it viewed illegitimacy as a suspect
classification or the father-illegitimate child relationship as fundamental. This reading of the opinion is reinforced by the fact that
the Court carefully distinguished Labine.96 Weber is best viewed as
an attempt to reconcile Labine and Levy. The notion that the compelling state interest standard of review may be applied to any
classification based on illegitimacy or hostile to the relationship between a father and his illegitimate child remains dubious.
However, it might be contended more narrowly that those laws
that curtail the parental privileges of the putative father still deserve
strict scrutiny. This possibility may not be wholly foreclosed by the
Court's decisions discussed above. Significantly, in Levy, Labine, and
Weber the Court dealt, respectively, with laws that barred the illegitimate child from ·wrongful death benefits, the ability to succeed to
property as an heir, and workmen's compensation benefits-all after
the death of the parent. These laws did not directly infringe upon
or curtail a possibly extant personal relationship between parent and
illegitimate child. Rather, they merely limited the rights of the
illegitimate child after the death of his parent in relation to rights
he would otherwise have had as a legitimate child. Similarly, the
classification in Glona merely precluded the mother from a cash
and the principles of stare decisis to hold that Levy did not control the facts of the
case before us.
406 U.S. at 172.
94. 406 U.S. at 173.
95. 406 U.S. at 176. The Court noted that, as in Glona, it cannot reasonably be
thought that persons will shun illicit relations because illegitimate children cannot
receive workmen's compensation benefits. 406 U.S. at 173. The Court also stated that
the statutory distinctions do not reflect a greater closeness between a father and his
legitimate children since dependency was a prerequisite to anyone's recovery. 406 U.S.
173-74.
96. The first ground for distinction was that Labine reflected a "traditional deference
to a State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its
borders." 406 U.S. at 170. The second distinction was that in Labine the intestate,
unlike the deceased in the present action, might easily have modified his illegitimate
daughter's unfavorable position. 406 U.S. at 170-71. In Labine the deceased could have
written a will leaving property to his daughter who could not be an heir if he died
intestate. But the deceased in Weber could not acknowledge his children since he could
not marry their mother, and thus they could not be qualified for protection under
the Louisiana workmen's compensation statute. It is unclear what the Court would
have done if decedent could have acknowledged his child, although Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result, felt that the Court would have struck down the classification
anyway. 406 U.S. at 176-77.
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benefit after the death of her illegitimate child. Certainly, it is
another thing for the law to discourage or preclude a personal relationship between a living father and his illegitimate child. The
question remains whether this is a constitutionally significant distinction, providing a stronger ground for application of the compelling interest test in the latter situation. Despite the Court's
utilization of the traditional equal protection standard when reviewing laws that were hostile to the legal relationship between
father and illegitimate child, is it possible that the putative father's
interest in a personal relationship with his child might be viewed as
fundamental?
The interest most directly affected by the illegitimacy classifications in the cases discussed above was primarily economic-the denial of some sort of after-death dollar benefit. Viewed in this light,
the use of the traditional standard of review under the equal protection clause is not surprising.117 The putative father's interest in
custody, visitation rights, or notice and an opportunity to be heard
at adoption proceedings is noneconomic; it is an intimate, personal
interest, arguably deserving greater judicial protection.
Recently in Stanley v. Illinois 98 the Supreme Court was squarely
confronted with a case involving the parental rights of the putative
father of an illegitimate child. Avoiding a clarification of the issue
whether the putative father has a fundamental interest in maintaining a personal relationship with his illegitimate child, the Court
decided the case essentially upon due process grounds. 00 Since the
Court's due process rationale has potentially far-reaching implications regarding the parental rights of the putative father, it is given
independent consideration below.100 However, in finding the father's
claims to be cognizable and substantial under the due process clause
the Court commented:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest
of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management
of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely
from shifting economic arrangements."101
The Court in Stanley seemed to feel that the relationship between
97. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family
Sec. Life Ins, Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
98. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
99. 405 U.S. at 658.
100. See text accompanying notes 132-78 infra.
101. 405 U.S. at 651, quoting Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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the petitioner, a putative father, and his child was as important as
that between a parent and a legitimate child. Indeed, the Court
expressly noted that "the law [has not] refused to recognize those
family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."102
Read broadly, the language in Stanley supports the contention
that the personal relationship between any father and child is fundamental. But in its context the quoted language may have only meant
that the putative father's interests are protected by the requirements
of procedural due process. Stanley's primary reliance on a due process rationale, rather than an equal protection one, may suggest that
infringement upon the father's interest will not invoke the compelling state interest test.
The chronology of Levy-Labine-Weber seems clearly to pronounce the end of any possibility of illegitimacy classifications being
held suspect. These cases also may have foreclosed the possibility
of the father-child relationship being held fundamental. After all,
the Court itself raised the possibility in Levy only seemingly to foreclose it in Labine. While the distinction between a legal and a personal relationship has some appeal, it is unlikely that the Court will
declare a personal relationship between a putative father and his
child to be fundamental. In recent equal protection cases, the Court
has refused to declare fundamental two personal interests of equal
or greater importance, sustenance1°3 and housing.104 Thus, one seeking to challenge current laws would be well advised to concentrate
his arguments elsewhere.

3. Sex as a New Suspect Classification?
The Impact of Reed v. Reed
The laws governing the parental privileges of custody, visitation,
and notice and an opportunity to be heard at adoption proceedings
clearly discriminate against the father of an illegitimate child as contrasted with the mother of the same child. Thus, these laws are quite
properly viewed as creating sexual classifications.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has not regarded sex as a
suspect classification.105 However, recently in Reed v. Reed106 the
102. 405 U.S. at 651.
103. Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970).
104. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
105. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872).
·
However, the California supreme court has recently held sex to be a suspe~t classification. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d I, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
Several other cases have struck down classifications based on sex. Seidenberg v.
McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp.· 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); White v. Crook, 251
F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400
(1968). Cf. Cohen v. Chesterfield eounty School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971);
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Court struck down an Idaho law that discriminated against women.
In order to resolve controversies over the appointment of estate
administrators, the Idaho law provided for a series of statutory preferences based on the relation of the petitioner to the decedent.
Within each class of relations men were to be preferred over
women. 107 In Reed the separated parents of a deceased minor
petitioned independently for appointment to administer his estate.
Since, as parents, both were in the same class of relatives, the
statutory preference favoring the male required that the father be
appointed administrator. The mother's claim that this treatment
violated the equal protection clause was rejected by the Idaho supreme court108 but sustained by a unanimous Supreme Court of the
United States.109
The Idaho court supplied two grounds for upholding the administrator preference law. The first ground was that the statute
was not designed to discriminate against women but to reduce
controversies over who should be appointed administrator, which
would othenvise require a hearing on the merits.110 To this end,
some order of preference among various classes was necessary. Under
the statute, not only were men preferred over women, but children
were preferred over parents, parents over brothers and sisters, and
so on. If the preference of child over parent is valid, why not that
of men over women? Apparently, the court believed that the state
could quite properly resolve these controversies by a set of mechanical rules. The second ground was that the legislature evidently
concluded that men are, on the whole, better qualified to administer
estates.111 The court noted that this generalization is not true in
every case, but was not prepared to say that it was "so completely
without a basis in fact as to be irrational and arbitrary."112 A third
Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va.
1970). Contra, Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969); Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
393 U.S. 982 (1968); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, mem.,
401 U.S. 951 (1971): Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 m. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 1173
(1969); State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 S.2d 891 (1970), revd. on other grounds
sub nom. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). Cf. La Fleur v. Cleveland Dd.
of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See generally Johnston &: Knapp, Sex
Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Prospective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV, 675 (1971).
106. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
107. [1943] Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 162, § I; Probate Practice Act of 1864, § 53, Idaho
Territory. The Idaho probate law involved in Reed was formerly codified at IDAHO
CODE §§ 15-312,-314 (1948). These laws were repealed effective July I, 1972, as Idaho
adopted the Uniform Probate Code. See [1971] Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 111.
108. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970).
109. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
110. 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 6!!8.
111. 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 688.
112. 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 638.
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rationale for the Idaho administrator preference scheme, noted in the
Supreme Court opinion, was that such a law may prevent intrafamily
squabbles over who shall be appointed administrator.113 To fulfill
this purpose, the Idaho legislature had to prefer one relation over
another, one sex over the other. This is essentially another "mechanical rule" argument.
In reversing the Idaho court's judgment, the Supreme Court did
not say that sex was a suspect classification. Rather, the Court purported to apply the rational relation test.114 The purposes of reducing the workload of the probate courts and promoting family
harmony were found to be permissible state purposes; 115 but the
means chosen, the mandatory preference based on sex, was deemed
an "arbitrary legislative choice." 116 Noting that those within the same
class of relatives were similarly. situated, the Court held that it was
a violation of equal protection. to favor one sex over the other within
each class. 117 The Court did not squarely note the argument, relied
upon by the Idaho court, that men are generally better estate administrators than women. It did, however, disparage this argument
obliquely, noting that under the statutory scheme "a woman whose
spouse dies intestate has a preference over a son, father, brother, or
any other male relative of the decedent." 118 Moreover, the Court
took judicial notice that a larg~ proportion of estates are administered by surviving widows.119
The Court in Reed failed to mention or cite earlier cases that
had upheld sexual classifications. These cases had looked for, at
best, a minimal rational relation between classification and purpose.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 120 for example, upheld a Michigan law that prohibited women from tending bar unless they were the wife or daughter of the bar's male mvner. The Court ignored the statute's most
obvious legislative purpose-monopolization of the trade for malesand found a purpose in protecting women from social vices. Because
of this, "Michigan could, beyond qu~stion, forbid all women .from
working behind a bar.''121 An exception for wives and daughters of
male tavernkeepers was deemed reasonable since the presence of a
male family member would tend to reduce danger to. a barmaid.
The Court made clear its view that sex was not an impermissible
classification: "The fact that women may now have achieved the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

404 U.S. at 76-77.
404 U.S. at 76.
404 U.S. at 76-77.
404 U.S. at 76.
404 U.S. at 77.
404 U.S. at 75.
404 U.S. at 75.
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
335 U.S. at 465.
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virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now
indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the
States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes .. , ." 122
In Hoyt v. Florida,123 the Court upheld Florida's automatic exemption from jury service for women. Since women who desired to
become jurors were required to register, there were few female jurors.
The Court concluded that a state could reasonably believe that since
a woman is still the center of the home life, she should automatically
be relieved of jury duty unless she felt such duty was consistent with
her responsibilities.124 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, added:
This case in no way resembles those involving race or color in
which the circumstances shown were found by this Court to compel
a conclusion of purposeful discriminatory exclusions from jury service.... There is present here neither the unfortunate atmosphere
of ethnic or-racial prejudices which underlay the situations depicted
in those cases nor the long course of discriminatory administrative
practice which the statistical showing in each of them evinced.121l

Thus, the Court did not consider sexual classifications to be in•
herently suspect, as were racial classifications.
The judicial attitude toward the sexual classifications in Reed
may represent a departure from the attitude evidenced in Goesaert
and Hoyt. The Court may be beginning to look at sexual classifications more seriously. There are several indications that the Court
would have upheld those classifications in Reed that favored one set
of relatives over another without favoring one sex over another. 126
Yet, if the vice of the sexual classification was that the mechanical
rules saved court time "arbitrarily" by favoring males over females
without determining the best administrator, then the rules favoring
some relatives ove~ others would be equally arbitrary. It could be
argued that the children of the deceased are generally closer to the
deceased than his parents and hence are better administrators of the
estate. But is it any less conceivable that, all other factors being
equal, men are better qualified, if only from practical business experience, as administrators? If no tenable distinction exists between
the rationality of sexual classifications as compared with lineal rela122. 335 U.S. at 466.
123. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
124. 368 U.S. at 61-62.
125. 368 U.S. at 68, citing Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
126. The Court continually stressed the arbitrary nature of the mandatory sex
classification. See 404 U.S. at 74, 76, 77. Indeed, the Court hinted that only one other
part of the Idaho statutory scheme was invalid-the section that favored brothers over
sisters. 404 U.S. at 74-75 n.4. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the favoritism
given males over females was not redeemed by the fact that it was part of a broader
scheme, thus implying that the favoritism given some relatives was valid. 404 U.S. at 77.
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tionship classifications in regard to the purpose of obtaining the best
administrator, then one may infer that the Court may have regarded
sex as a special criterion for classification. While the Court will uphold arbitrary mechanital rules favoring one class of relatives over
another in order to decrease the workload of the probate courts and
to promote intrafamily harmony, it will not uphold a mechanical
rule favoring one sex over the other. Thus, although the Court
ostensibly employed the rationality test, it is arguable that it was in
fact applying a stricter standard of review to the sexual classifications.
However, the argument that because the Court employed a
stricter standard of review in Reed, sex is now a suspect classification,
would probably fail in the face of the Court's explicit "rationality"
language. Reed v. Reed is a Janus-like decision. It might be viewed
as a cautious first step in a line of precedent that will conclude with
the express recognition of sex as a suspect classification.127 But the
decision will probably be read narrowly as a rather unique case that
struck down a peculiar statute under the traditional equal protection
standard, and the potentially broader implications of the decision
may be ignored.
Two recent Supreme Court summary affirmances of lower federal
court decisions suggest that the latter reading of Reed is the more
likely. In Williams v. McNair128 the Court upheld a state university's
exclusion of males on the ground that all-male and coeducational
state schools of similar quality were available. Forbush v. Wallace129
upheld a regulation requiring that a married woman use her husband's surname on a driver's license application. Although both of
these cases involved difficult problems of the extent to which the
equal protection clause invalidates sexual classifications, the Court's
disposition of them manifested a reluctance to proceed, if proceed
at all, at anything more than a deliberate pace. Indeed, the cases
cast serious doubt on the proposition that sex is a suspect classification.
Two cases decided in the spring of 1972 might have clarified this
area but did not do so. In Alexander v. Louisiana,130 the Court
127. One technique of overruling prior decisions is first to set up a line of contrary
decisions so that the Court can later say that the prior decisions have been drained
of all vitality. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright, The "ATt" of Overruling, 1963 SUP.
Cr. REV. 211, 223-26.
Commentators have discussed the implications and the desirability of treating sex
as a suspect classification. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We
Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L REY. 1499 (1971); Comment, Are
Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 481 (1971). Cf.
Brown, Emerson, Falk &: Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
128. 401 U.S. 951 (1971), afjg. mem. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
129. 405 U.S. 970 (1972), afjg. mem. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971) •.
130. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
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avoided the issue of whether equal protection prohibits exclusion of
women from grand juries and instead decided the case on the ground
that the state had unconstitutionally excluded blacks from grand
juries. More significantly, in Stanley v. Illinois the Court avoided a
clarification of the sexual classification issue as well as the fundamental interest issue.131 Thus, the proposition that classifications disfavoring the putative father are suspect classifications based upon
sex, as well as the proposition that the putative father has a fundamental interest in maintaining or developing a personal relationship
with his illegitimate child, remains dubious. Stanley, however, deserves a detailed examination since its due process rationale may
provide a touchstone for future litigation concerning the parental
rights of the putative father.

III.

THE SURPRISING EMERGENCE OF DUE PROCESS

A. Stanley v. Illinois
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act132 has special provisions establishing procedures for the care of dependent children. The statutory
definition of "dependent child" includes those minor children who
are living without a "parent" or court-appointed guardian. 183 Significantly, the definition of "parent" includes the mother, but not
the father, of an illegitimate child. 134 In Stanley an unmarried man
and woman lived together intermittently for eighteen years, during
which time they had three children.186 After the mother died, the
state instituted proceedings to have the two youngest children adjudicated dependent. The trial court concluded that since the children's father had never married their mother, the father was not a
"parent" under the statutory scheme. Thus, the children were "dependent," and became wards of the court upon their mother's death.
Consequently, the court granted the state's request for appointment
of two neighbors as guardians.186 The father's claim that the Illinois
statute's discrimination between mother and father violated the
equal protection clause was rejected on appeal by the Illinois supreme court, which held that the classification was rational, given
the purposes of the Act.137
The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois judgment, holding that
the statutory procedure violated both the due process and equal pro131.
132,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See text accompanying notes 98·100 supra.
ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (1971 8: Supp. 1972).
ILL. R.Ev. STAT, ch, 37, § 702-5 (1971).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1971),
405 U.S. at 646.
See Brief for Petitioner at 4•6, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970).
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tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.188 The Court's equal
protection holding was deduced from and dependent upon its due
process holding, as the following passage indicates:
We have concluded that [under the Due Process Clause] all Illinois
parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It follows that
denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting
it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.1so
Thus, it is the due process holding on which the decision turned. 140
In considering the Illinois procedure under the due process
clause, the Court observed that it was "firmly established that 'what
procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action.' " 141 Stressing the strong "private interest ... of a man in the children he has sired and raised" 142
and drawing no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate family relationships,148 the Court noted that "Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and substantial.''144
The Court did not question Illinois' statutory purpose, but only
the means used by the state in order to achieve its objective. The
Court observed that the stated purpose1of the Juvenile Court Act is
to protect "the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the community" and to "strengthen
the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the
custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal ... .''141i
Given this purpose, the Court observed that
138. 405 U.S. at 649.
139. 405 U.S. at 658. In reply, Chief Justice Burger in dissent said, "This 'method
of analysis' is, of course, no more or less than the use of the Equal Protection Clause
as a shorthand condensation of the entire Constitution .•••" 405 U.S. at 660.
140. The due process rationale was surprising since it had not been argued in any
court. See Brief for Petitioner, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Chief Justice
Burger noted that, under precedent, this was exceeding the Court's jurisdiction. 405
U.S. at 659-60 (dissenting opinion). The Court replied by pointing to its feeble equal
protection holding and saying, "(w]e dispose of the case on the constitutional premise
raised below, reaching the result by a method of analysis readily available to the state
court." 405 U.S. at 658 n.10.
141. 405 U.S. at 650, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961).
142. 405 U.S. at 651.
143. 405 U.S. at 651·52.
144. 405 U.S. at 652.
145. 405 U.S. at 652, quoting ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1971).
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the State registers no gain toward its declared goals when it separates
children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit
father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly
separates him from his family.146
From this reasoning, and relying on Bell v. Burson141 and Carrington v. Rash,148 the Court held that Illinois must give the putative
father a hearing on his fitness before depriving him of his children.
Administrative convenience could not justify the state's failure to
provide such a hearing.149 The Court stated:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized interpretation. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of
both parent and child.150
The curious aspect of this decision was that in the guise of procedural due process, the Court struck down Illinois' substantive law.
The father in Stanley in fact had been granted a hearing. What the
Court objected to was that the only issue in the father's hearing was
whether he had ever married his children's mother. The Court
dictated to Illinois the substance of the putative father's hearing
when it insisted that the state inquire into his fitness before removing
his children. Conceding that the difference between substance and
procedure is unclear in many contexts,11i1 the result in Stanley appears clearly substantive.
Since the judicial crisis of the 1930's, the Court, when reviewing
statutes under the due process clause, has been very reluctant to
strike down substantive rules but quite willing to require that states
adopt certain procedural safeguards.162 The two cases relied upon by
the Court in Stanley do not provide a solid foundation for the apparent mixing of these two concepts.
Bell v. Burson involved a Georgia administrative system in which
the driver's license of an uninsured motorist was suspended when the
motorist became involved in an accident, unless the motorist could
post sufficient security to meet possible claims.168 The Supreme Court
146. 405 U.S. at 652-53.
147. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
148. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
149. 405 U.S. at 656-57.
150. 405 U.S. at 657.
151. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
152. Compare Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), with Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), with
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
153. GA. CooE ANN. § 92A-605 (Supp. 1972).
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held that a hearing on a driver's probable liability for any claims
arising out of the accident was mandatory before his license could
be suspended.154 Bell is distinguishable from Stanley since in Bell
there would have eventually been a hearing to determine the driver's
liability in the accident and a finding that the driver was without
liability would have lifted his suspension at that time.155 Indeed, the
Court made this ppint in rejecting Georgia's argument "that it need
not provide a hearing on liability because fault and liability are
irrelevant to the statutory scheme."156 Thus, Bell is a classic example
of the judicial imposition of a procedural safeguard that does not
contradict the state's substantive scheme. In Stanley, on the other
hand, Illinois never required a later hearing on the father's parental
fitness; his fitness in the particular case was irrelevant to the substantive scheme.
The other case relied on by the Court, Carrington v. Rash, .involved an equal protection challenge to a Texas law creating an
irrebuttable presumption that servicemen were not bona fide residents and hence precluding them from voting. Carrington involved
access to the ballot, clearly a fundamental interest.157 The Court in
that case demanded that more precise classifications be employed to
determine which servicemen were bona fide residents of the state.
Imprecision of classification is a problem in Stanley-a child's welfare may be diminished if he is taken away from a fit putative father.
But the Court in Stanley did not deal with this problem under the
equal protection clause; rather, it held that a hearing on the putative
father's fitness was a requisite of due process. Thus, the Court's
application of Carrington's imprecise classification rationale to the
statute involved in Stanley was an unusual use of precedent.

The Application of Stanley v. Illinois to Other
Discriminations Against the Putative Father
The effect of Stanley on other discriminations against the putative
father is unclear. As Chief Justice Burger said in his dissent, the
decision "embarks on a novel concept of the natural law for unwed
fathers that could well have strange boundaries as yet undiscemible."rns Because the Court used the language of procedural due
B.

154. 402 U.S. at 542-43.
155. GA. ConE ANN. § 92A-607 (Supp. 1972).
156. 402 U.S. at 541.
157. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1972). The opinion in Carrington
itself is unclear. The Court first states that there must be a reasonable relation between
the classification and its purpose, 380 U.S. at 93, and then later states that the right
to vote is close "to the core of our constitutional system" and may not be casually
denied, 380 U.S. at 96. Despite this ambiguity, Carrington has been recognized as
applying a more stringent equal protection test. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
660 &: n.8 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. 405 U.S. at 668.
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process, Stanley should be solid precedent in that area. But since its
holding affected state substantive law, Stanley may also have substantive implications.

I. Procedural Effects of Stanley
As discussed above, 159 most states deny the putative father notice
of a pending adoption. Notice and a right to be heard are traditional
requirements of procedural due process.160 In holding that the putative father's interest in his child is "cognizable" under the due process clause,161 Stanley raises the issue whether these requirements of
due process apply to the putative father's interest in his child's adoption.162 It might be contended that due process only protects the
interest of a "man in the children he has sired and raised," 163 not
that of a father who has never seen or who rarely sees his child.
This argument, however, is totally impractical because such a limitation would require an investigation in every case to determine the
extent of the putative father's relationship with the child prior to
the adoption,164 and such investigations would not be without borderline situations of interpretive difficulty. Therefore, it seems far
simpler and the only reasonable reading of Stanley to hold that the
blood relationship between father and child is in itself a substantial
interest protected by due process.
In order to evaluate the procedural due process claim that notice
and a hearing must be given the putative father, one must consider
not only the interests of the father, but also those of the state.10u
Because the father may provide suggestions concerning the child's
future that would not otherwise be considered, the state cannot argue
that denying the putative father notice and an opportunity to be
heard would necessarily further the child's interests.166 It is especially
important that the father be given some hearing within a short time
after the child is surrendered for adoption so that any custody issues
are resolved before the child becomes attached to one guardian. 167
The contention that such a procedural requirement would upset
See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950),
405 U.S. at 652.
In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the Court held that due process
requires notice to the father of a legitimate child before adoption.
163. 405 U.S. at 651.
164. Cf. Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right to Notice,
159.
160.
161.
162.

1968 U. Iu.. L.F. 232, 236-37.
165. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971): Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262-66 (1970).
166. See Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be Heard, 50 M1NN,
L. REv. 1071, 1084 (1966).
167. See id. at 1080, 1085.
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adoption proceedings and create uncertainty is dubious. Only rea•
sonable efforts to notify the father are necessary; if he cannot be
located, the adoption may still proceed.168 The increased costs of
serving process would not justify the failure to give notice since
relatively inexpensive means, such as the mail, could be used.169
Because there is no apparent substantial countervailing state interest,
notice to the putative father and an opportunity to be heard at adop•
tion proceedings should be required by the due process clause.17°
The father should be heard, if he so desires, at the parental termina•
tion hearing. 171 If no parental termination hearing is required by
state law, he should be allowed to bring an independent custody
proceeding within a reasonable time. 172 Only such procedures can
ensure that an interested parent's suggestions for his child's future
will at least be considered before the adoption becomes final.

2. Substantive Effects of Stanley
While the impact of Stanley on procedural due process issues is
fairly clear, its effect on substantive discriminations is uncertain. If
Stanley presages strict scrutiny of the substantive laws that discriminate against the putative father, its effect could be devastating.
Unless held to its facts, Stanley would vitiate the current state laws
that automatically favor the mother, if she is a fit parent, in custody
disputes with the putative father. 173 In this situation it might
168. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
169. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-19.
170. Contra, Thomas v. Children's Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961);
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051
(1972).
One aggravating problem is finding an appropriate remedy for a failure to give
notice to the father. To give the father custody after the child had spent some time
with the adoptive parents would vindicate the father's rights but also would likely
harm the child. The Court in vacating the judgment in Rothstein for consideration in
light of Stanley recognized this, for it ordered due consideration be given "for the completion of the adoption proceeding and the fact that the child has apparently lived
with the adoptive parents for the intervening period of time." 405 U.S. at 1051. One
student commentator has argued that this lack of an effective remedy vitiates the right.
Note, 1971 WIS. L. REv. 1262, supra note 3, at 1270-73. This ignores the fact that usually
the Court has created remedies when needed to vindicate a recognized right. See, e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A possible alternative remedy is to give the father
a cause of action against the adoption agency that allowed adoption without attempting to give the father notice. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). In any case, it is likely that responsible agencies, not wanting to risk a change in
custody after placement, would attempt to give the father notice. See Comment, supra
note 164, at 237.
171. Cf. In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 731 (1963), decided on merits, 269
Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964).
172. Cf. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Brennan, 270
Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965).
173. See authorities cited in notes 8-9 supra.
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be said that the state is still proceeding by presumption contrary to
the spirit of Stanley. The Court noted in Stanley that while many
putative fathers may be unsuitable parents, "some are wholly suited
to have custody of their children." 174 Similarly, some putative fathers
will provide a better environment and have a better relationship
with the child than its mother, although she too is a fit parent. This
result may be desirable in terms of policy; but if the focus is upon
the state's failure to further the child's welfare in every case, then
all of the laws that discriminate against the putative father share this
defect. 176 For this reason, courts might be reluctant to extend Stanley
at all for fear that, absent a stopping point, all of these laws would
be invalid.
There is at least one tenable argument to limit Stanley to its
facts. In Stanley the state on its own initiative intervened into a
family's life and took the child away from the father. Suits between
private individuals are probably a more common method of determining child custody than dependency actions initiated by government.176 It might be contended that Stanley only requires a hearing
on the father's fitness when the state intervenes to take custody away
from the father; the courts may still irrebuttably presume that the
father is unfit, or less fit, when there is a custody dispute between
private individuals. This limitation would reconcile the result in
Stanley with its procedural due process language: when a state takes
custody of a child or something else of importance from an individual, it must hold a hearing to ensure that it is furthering its
announced goals. This "procedural" limitation of Stanley's value as
precedent, however, ignores the substantive impact the case had on
Illinois' Juvenile Court Act. Apparently no other procedural due
process case has required that a state determine certain issues in its
hearings; prior cases required only that, given the substantive law,
states grant individuals notice and a hearing. 177 Although one cannot
be sure what course the courts will take,178 procedural limitation of
Stanley appears to be a likely result. Given the apparent reluctance
of the Supreme Court to extend the reach of constitutional adjudica174. 405 U.S. at 654.
175. See text accompanying notes 49-59 supra.
176. Among the most common procedural devices in private custody disputes is the
writ of habeas corpus. Unlike the writ used in criminal cases, the welfare of the child
rather than the legal right to custody is the ultimate issue. See, e.g., New York Found•
ling Hospital v. Gatt., 203 U.S. 429 (1906); Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid So•
ciety v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949). Other procedural mechanisms include
petitions in equity and petitions for guardianship. See generally H. CLARK, supra note
5, § 17.3.
177. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Schroeder v, City
of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
178. We shall soon learn what one state court thinks of this problem. See Vanderlaan
v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding for consideration in light
of Stanley v, Illinois 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970).
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tion in this area, the Court is not likely to force states to change their
current laws without some outside impetus. The political process,
however, may be providing this impetus in the form of a constitutional amendment.
IV.

THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT

While the decisions discussed above were being argued, considered, and decided, Congress was deliberating and passing a proposed amendment to the Constitution that would provide for
equality of rights between men and women.179 If this amendment is
ratified by the required three fourths of the states,180 the issues
raised by the cases will be rendered moot since the amendment will
mandate the far-reaching changes only tenuously suggested by the
case law.
With deceptive simplicity the operative provision of the proposed
amendment provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex." 181 Although the ru;nbiguity of this provision has been extensively criticized,182 for present purposes only two issues need be
discussed: (1) Does the amendment prohibit discrimination that
favors women over men; and (2) what is the proper standard for
judicial review under the amendment?
.
The first issue can be resolved readily by reference to the amendment's legislative history, which indicates that the amendment was
intended to grant complete equality between the sexes. Both houses
of Congress defeated amendments that would have exempted women
from the draft.183 Specifically in regard to child custody one House
supporter of the amendment stated:
[T]he amendment would eliminate any legal presumption favoring
the granting of custody to the mother. As a result, child custody cases
would have to be determined by the courts in terms of the needs and
best interests of each individual child.184
179. The proposed amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), passed
the House on Oct. 12, 1971. 117 CONG. REc. H.9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). Reed was
decided on November 22, 1971. 404 U.S. at 71. The amendment passed the Senate on
March 22, 1972. 118 CONG. REc. S.4612 (daily ed. March 22, 1972). Stanley was decided on
1
April 3, 1972. 405 U.S. at 645.
180. At least twenty states of the required thirty-eight have ratified the amendment,
30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1529 (1972).
181. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1971).
182. See, e.g., Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment ls Not the Way, 6 HARV.
CIV. R.IGHTS·CIV. Lm. L. REv. 234 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some
Problems of Construction, id. at 243.
183. 118 CONG. REc. S.4394 (daily ed. March 21, 1972); 117 CoNG. REc. H.9390 {daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1971).
184. 117 CONG. REc. H.9247 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Representative
Edwards).
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The legislative history in the Senate also supports the conclusion that
domestic relations laws favoring women would be void. 186 The Senate
Report stated the basic principle of the amendment: "[S]ex should
not be a factor in determining the legal rights of men or of
women." 186 Thus, the amendment will protect men as well as women.
The second issue, the appropriate level of judicial review of
statutes that classify by sex, cannot, but need not, be answered
definitively. One thing is certain-Congress did not intend that
sexual classifications should be upheld on the basis of a mere rational
relation between the classification and some state objective. A Judiciary Committee amendment that would have upheld sex classifications that "reasonably promote the health and safety of the people" 187
was defeated on the floor of the House. The Senate Report, adopting
the minority statement of the House Report, stated generally:
The legal principle underlying the [proposed amendment] is that
the law must deal with the individual attributes of the particular
person and not with stereotypes of over-classification based on sex.
However,· [the amendment] does not require that women must be
treated in all respects the same as men. "Equality" does not mean
"sameness." As a result, the [amendment] would not prohibit reasonable classifications based on characteristics that are unique to one sex.
For examble, [sic] a law providing for payment of the medical costs
of child bearing could only apply to women. In contrast, if a particular characteristic is found among members of both sexes, then
under the proposed amendment it is not the sex factor but the individual factor which should be determinative.1 ss
The laws disfavoring the putative father's parental rights are not
based on characteristics unique to one sex or the other, for good
parents can be found among both sexes. Thus, these laws will probably be in violation of the Constitution upon ratification of the proposed amendment. Read literally, the Senate Report would bar
blanket discrimination against the putative father no matter how
compelling the interest supporting the classification. Indeed, an influential article saw this as an advantage to the amendment. 180
However, it is possible that, by judicial interpretation, a minimum standard of review under the amendment might be to scrutinize
sexual classifications under a standard, derived from existing case
185. 118 CONG. REc. S.4389 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Dayh):
S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1972).
186. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 185, at 2.
187. 117 CONG. R.Ec. H.9390 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). See also H.R. REP. No, 92-859,
92d Cong., 1st Sess (1971).
188. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 185, at 12, quoting H.R. REP. No, 92-359, supra
note 187, at 7.
189. :i:Jrown, ll:mCTSon, Falk & Freecunap, supra note 127, at 880-81 1 889-90,
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law, that would incorporate the compelling state interest test.190 This
difference is more theoretical than real, for, as illustrated above, the
laws disfavoring the putative father cannot withstand the strict scrutiny of the compelling interest test.191
V.

CONCLUSION

A range of constitutional doctrines and cases potentially affect
the laws governing the parental rights of the putative father. But
the most important cases, Reed v. Reed and Stanley v. Illinois, are
ambiguous. Absent a ratification of the proposed equal rights amendment, a narrow reading of these cases is likely. The Court would
naturally be reluctant to strike down many sexual classifications following a defeat of the proposed amendment, and the Court would
have little incentive to extend Stanley beyond procedural due process.
However, all doubts raised by the cases and all current laws that
discriminate against the putative father would be swept away if the
proposed constitutional amendment is ratified by the states. Consequently, the putative father would be able to gain custody of his
child when he is the best available guardian, gain the right to visit
his child in suitable circumstances, and would have an equal voice
when adoption is considered for his child.
These changes will come more from the logic of legal arguments
than from any outpouring of public sympathy for the plight of the
putative father. But to focus only upon the legal gains of the putative
father is to miss the crux of the social problem involved. The primary
public concern should be for the welfare of the illegitimate child.
Current laws with their wooden preferences for the mother are simply not promoting this interest in every case. A forced change in
current laws may not significantly affect current social relations-the
mother will probably remain the parent closest to the illegitimate
child. These changes will, however, require courts to engage in the
difficult task of determining the welfare of the illegitimate child in
each dispute concerning the child. Only then can the states claim
that their domestic relations laws promote the best interests of the
illegitimate child.
190. See S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 185, at 12-13, quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-359,
supra note 187, at 7 (minority statement).
191. See text accompanying notes 49-69 supra.

